International actors in the Syrian conflict by PHILLIPS, CJO
ORIENT II/2019 7
Christopher Phillips
International actors in the Syrian conflict
Eight years after it began, Syria’s long and
bloody civil war is edging to its conclusion.
The various domestic forces challenging
President Bashar al-Assad’s rule have largely
been defeated, and those that remain in the
field are fighting for survival in distant pockets
rather than threatening Damascus. Rebel
forces, who initially took up arms in response
to al-Assad’s repression of peaceful pro-
testors in 2011, retain only the northern
province of Idlib and the eastern border town
of al-Tanf. The so-called Islamic State (IS)
has been ejected from its former stronghold
of Eastern Syria. Meanwhile, the Kurdish-
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
who defeated them, now fear conquest by 
either al-Assad or Turkey. 
Al-Assad may not yet control all of pre-war
Syria, but he has vowed to recapture ‘every
inch’, and with his enemies looking spent this
no longer seems impossible. However, much
will be out of al-Assad’s hands. His relative
victory, and his enemies’ defeat, has been
shaped by the actions of external powers,
whether his allies Russia and Iran, or his 
enemies the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and Turkey. While Syrian forces have not
been the puppets of foreign powers, they
have frequently been enabled or hindered by
external backers. This will remain so as the
conflict enters its endgame, with regional and
international governments playing a key role
in determining how, if at all, Syria’s war ends.
I. Moscow and Washington
At the international level, Russian and 
American interventions have played a major
role in determining the conflict, and their
machinations will shape whatever outcome
emerges. Russian President vladimir Putin’s
decision to send forces to Syria in September
2015 was a key turning point in the war. 
This shored up the government from what 
looked like an impending collapse, reviving 
al-Assad’s fortunes against the rebels and IS.
It also ultimately positioned Russia as the
leading external power in Syria, accepted –
however reluctantly – by regional powers and
the US.1 Yet Moscow impacted the war 
before 2015 too, providing al-Assad with key
diplomatic, economic and military support. 
As early as October 2011, a few months into
the anti-al-Assad rebellion, Russia deployed
its veto at the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to protect Damascus from 
international condemnation, and with it
harsher sanctions and possibly military 
action. It would go on to protect Syria by 
veto eleven more times. Russia similarly 
frustrated Western and regional powers 
from engineering al-Assad’s departure via 
UN-led mediation efforts, such as the 2012
Geneva summit. Economically, Moscow
helped Syria circumvent Western sanctions
and provided a generous line of credit on vital
new arms purchases.2
After 2015 Russian military support was key
to al-Assad’s reconquests. The Russian air
force and special forces supported Syrian and
Iranian-backed forces in a string of military
victories in 2016-18, including the capture of
Eastern Aleppo, Ghouta and Deraa from the
rebels, and Palmyra and Deir-Es-Zor from IS.
Yet Moscow’s involvement went far beyond
the military. It deepened its physical presence
in Syria, building a major new air base 
in Khmeimim near Lattakia, expanding its 
1 Katz, Balancing Act, 2018.
2 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 2016, 147-150.
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existing naval base in Tartus, and reportedly
building several smaller outposts in southern
and eastern Syria. It strengthened its 
institutional ties with Syria’s military, training
and equipping a new division of the Syrian
army, the Fifth Corps, and forging close ties
with al-Assad’s crack troops, the ‘Tiger
Forces’.3 Economically, Russian companies
are expected to play a leading role in Syria’s
reconstruction, with energy companies in 
particular being courted by Damascus and
promoted by the Kremlin.4 This presence 
was broadly welcomed by many al-Assad 
supporters, preferring secular Russia to 
al-Assad’s other key ally, Islamist Iran.5
The depth of its involvement in Syria, and 
the sense that it is there to stay, greatly 
enhanced Russia’s leverage as the conflict’s
key international broker. Moscow initiated 
its own mediation, the Astana process, 
which heavily favoured al-Assad, unlike 
earlier UN talks. Turkey was persuaded by
concessions in northern Syria to join Russia
and Iran as guarantors of ‘de-escalation
zones’, which al-Assad then broke, with 
Russian acquiescence, to retake all rebel
areas bar Idlib. Thereafter Moscow presented
al-Assad’s continued rule as a fait accompli. 
It oversaw a deliberately laboured process 
of drawing up a new Syrian constitution, 
which would still keep al-Assad in charge,
while urging former foes to re-open ties 
with Damascus and provide much needed 
reconstruction aid. 
While some observers saw Russia’s 
successes in Syria as a US defeat, in reality
Washington had very different aims and 
interests to Moscow. Syria had been
Moscow’s ally dating back to the 1960s, with
Tartus its only Mediterranean naval base, and
as such, Russia was likely to fight hard to 
defend al-Assad. In contrast, the US shifted
its priorities. Early in the war it called for 
al-Assad’s departure, launching sanctions
against him and supporting rebel forces 
to achieve this goal. Yet toppling al-Assad
was never the only priority. The Obama 
administration also wished to prevent 
the usage and proliferation of al-Assad’s
chemical weapons (CW), limit the power of 
Jihadists and avoid damaging the president’s
geostrategic goals, notably negotiating a 
nuclear disarmament agreement with al-
Assad’s ally, Iran. The ebbing and flowing 
of these priorities produced inconsistent 
US policies that frustrated the rebels and 
Washington’s anti-al-Assad regional allies,
like Turkey. For example, Obama was 
reluctant to arm the rebels, fearing weapons
would fall into the hands of Jihadists among
them, yet eventually relented – only to 
discover that by this point the moderate 
rebels were already too weak.6 He likewise 
threatened al-Assad with a ‘red line’ if he 
used CW, but then pulled out of a prepared
strike in September 2013, accepting instead
a Russian mediated deal to remove Syria’s
stockpile. He then did launch strikes on 
Syria the next year, but against IS in the 
east instead of al-Assad, and favoured 
arming and training the Kurdish-led SDF
rather than the rebels. Such policies shaped
the conflict and contributed, alongside the
machinations of regional powers, to the 
weakness of the rebels that aided al-
Assad’s victory. 
Russia’s intervention combined with the 
coming to office of President Donald Trump 
in early 2017 saw further shifts in US 
priorities. Though Trump did launch two 
punishing missile strikes when al-Assad was
3 Waters, The Tiger Forces, 2018.
4 Hille, Foy and Seddon, Russian business first in line, 2018.
5 Lazkani, Local actors in the Syrian coast, 2018.
6 Lister, The Syrian Jihad, 2015, 1-10.
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alleged to have used CW in violation of the
2013 agreement, he appeared even less 
committed to toppling the Syrian president
than Obama was. Brash and unpredictable, 
in July 2017 Trump abruptly ended Timber
Sycamore, the CIA-led programme that
armed and trained moderate rebels. A 
year later he said little when al-Assad 
and Russia disregarded a US-guaranteed
ceasefire to force them out of southern 
Syria. Trump’s immediate focus instead was 
expanding Obama’s anti-IS campaign, upping
the arms to the SDF and increasing US 
forces to 2,000. For a while this allowed 
Kurdish-led eastern Syria to become a US-
protected fiefdom, with hawkish officials such
as National Security Advisor John Bolton
drawing up plans to use the region as 
a permanent buffer against Iran.7 Yet in 
December 2018, Trump suddenly announced
his intention to withdraw all US forces 
from Syria. Washington’s shifting priorities, in
this case Trump’s desire to fulfil election
pledges to bring troops home, once again 
had shaped the conflict on the ground, 
leaving the Kurds to the mercy of Turkey 
or al-Assad and seemingly removing the last
major obstacle to Russia’s dominance.
II. Regional players
At the regional level, Iran, Israel, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have all played a 
role in the conflict, whether sponsoring 
different actors, directly intervening or both.
Regional powers had taken the lead earlier 
in the war, especially Iran, Turkey and the
Gulf powers, but tended to balance one 
another out, creating a stalemate.8 After 
the involvement of the US and Russia from
2014-15, the regional powers’ impact was 
reduced, though Iran and Turkey especially
continued to play a sizeable role. 
II.1 Iran
Iran was the most significant regional power
involved in Syria’s civil war and its actions 
arguably saved al-Assad. The Islamic 
Republic allied with Syria shortly after its 1979
revolution and saw preserving the al-Assad
regime as both a historical duty to a long-term
ally and a strategic necessity to preserve a
keystone link with its allies in Lebanon and
Iraq. While Iran did initially caution al-Assad
against excessive violence in 2011, when this
advice was ignored Tehran still doubled
down. Like Russia it sent vital economic and
military support, including loans of USD
4.6bn, heavily discounted oil and extensive
weaponry. Yet most important was personnel.
With al-Assad facing military setbacks along-
side severe manpower shortages, Iran sent
its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, to fight along-
side the Syrian army in 2012. Qassem
Suleimani, the head of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, 
was dispatched to Damascus to shore up 
the war effort. He helped reorganise 
Syria’s military, established new paramilitary
forces – including the new National Defence
Forces (NDF) – and brought in foreign Shia 
fighters from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. These Iranian-led forces played
leading roles in key battles such as Qusayr
(2013), Qalamoun (2013-14) and East Aleppo
(2016). Suleimani was also partly responsible
for Russia’s 2015 actions, having flown to
Moscow to plead for assistance.9
Like Russia, Iran established a far deeper
presence in Syria than it had prior to 2011 and
is unlikely to withdraw as the war winds down.
Before the conflict Iran mostly dealt with
regime officials, although it had boosted its
ties with Syria’s tiny Shia community (1% of
the population). Yet as a result of the war
7 Lund, The making and unmaking of Syria strategy under Trump, 2018.
8 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 2016, 232.
9 Filkins, The shadow commander, 2013.
10 Al-Saadi, Iran’s stake in Syria’s economy, 2015.
11 Bachner, Iran has 10 military bases in Syria, 2018.
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Iran’s influence spread. Bilateral trade jumped
from USD 300m in 2010 to USD 1bn in 
2014, making Iran Syria’s biggest trade 
partner, while Iranian companies were given
preferential treatment and tax exemptions.10
At a social level, Suleimani fostered a small
but loyal cadre in the Syrian population,
sometimes providing citizenship for foreign
Shia fighters and settling them in strategic 
locations, especially around the Shia shrine 
of Sayyeda Zeinab in southern Damascus. At
a military level, Iran built up to 10 bases 
inside Syria, used for training its militia, 
resupplying Hezbollah and keeping pressure
on neighbouring Israel.11
Alongside potential clashes with Israel, 
discussed below, Iran faces competition from
its ally Russia for influence in post-conflict
Syria. Both favour al-Assad’s continued rule,
but priorities and approaches differ. While
Russia has sought to strengthen al-Assad’s
state, boosting Syria’s military and institutions,
Iran has favoured sub-state militia. As a result
they have different military allies in Syria:
Moscow is close to the military, Tehran to the
NDF and other militia. Geographically, Russia
concentrates its forces on the coast near its
bases in Latakia and Tartus, Iran prioritises
southern Damascus and the connecting roads
that link Damascus Airport, the Sayyeda
Zeinab shrine and the Qalamoun mountains
into Lebanon, while Hezbollah has taken 
effective control of the border town of Qusayr.
How much al-Assad seeks to regain 
direct control of these areas, especially the
Iranian-dominated ones, may be a future
source of tension. Similarly, Russia’s desire
to gain economic reward from Syria has come
at Iranian cost, with Russian companies now
gaining preference over Iranian ones in some
key sectors. Though this will unlikely end the
Russia-Iran-al-Assad alliance, it may cause
friction and occasional violence between
proxy forces.
II.2 Turkey
Turkey’s decision to turn on Bashar al-Assad,
calling for his removal in late 2011 despite 
formerly enjoying close ties, was a major
boost for the rebels. Turkey sponsored the 
exiled political opposition, notably the Syrian
National Council (SNC) and its successor the
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), and 
facilitated the arming of numerous armed
rebel groups. Turkish Prime Minister (and
later President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
believed al-Assad’s fall was inevitable and
hoped that by backing the opposition, 
especially those aligned with his favoured
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a pro-Turkish 
government would emerge. However, when
al-Assad clung on and the US did not 
then intervene as hoped, Ankara grew 
frustrated. With Russia intervening in 2015,
Erdoğan shifted his priorities. Though he 
still called for al-Assad’s departure, 
privately Turkey’s priority in Syria was 
reduced to the security situation on its 
southern border: preventing the collapse of
Idlib and containing Kurdish militia.
Turkish intransigence on the Kurds con-
tributed to the rebels’ weakness as an 
opposition. Ankara insisted that the Syrian
Kurdish PYD, an affiliate of the Turkish 
Kurdish separatists of the PKK, be excluded
from any Syrian opposition groupings. As a
result, the PYD – which was already dis-
trustful of the SNC/SOC – pursued its own
path, opposing al-Assad but using the civil
war to pursue Kurdish autonomy rather than
joining the main rebel groups. The PYD’s 
militia, the YPG and YPJ, trained and armed
by the PKK, emerged as the most powerful
Kurdish fighters and soon dominated eastern
Syria as al-Assad’s forces withdrew to fight
the rebels elsewhere, alarming Ankara. Even
more worrying was Washington’s decision in
2014 to arm the YPG to fight IS, helping it
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forge the broader SDF with some Arab 
fighters. With the US strategy successful and
IS pushed back, Ankara faced the prospect of
a US-supported PYD-dominated government
all along its southern border. To prevent 
this, it launched two incursions into Syria.
Firstly, Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016,
which targeted IS positions along the border
but was designed to wedge Turkey’s rebel 
allies between two PYD positions: Afrin and
Manbij. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 
then attacked Afrin directly, using a com-
bination of Turkish military and rebel proxies
to eject the PYD. Officially these provinces
were then ruled by rebel forces, but they were
effectively controlled by Ankara. Many 
accused Turkey of ethnically cleansing Kurds
to permanently transform the region into 
a pro-Turkish satellite. 
Erdoğan therefore reacted positively to the
Trump administration’s decision to withdraw
US forces – something Turkey had long 
demanded. Without US protection the SDF
may face a Turkish onslaught, with Erdoğan
long threatening an attack on Manbij. 
However, Russia is key. Euphrates Shield
and Olive Branch had Russian approval, part
of wider deals with Moscow, and any future
attack would need it too. However, Putin’s
preference is for al-Assad, not Ankara, to take
control of eastern Syria. Moscow has long
favoured a PYD-al-Assad deal in which the
Syrian state peacefully retakes the east, with
the YPG folded into al-Assad’s military. 
The PYD’s leadership were split on this,
though most preferred it to Turkish attack. 
Despite his hawkish rhetoric at home, partly
geared towards 2019 municipal elections,
Erdoğan may have to accept al-Assad’s return
to the east if and when the US eventually 
withdraws, rather than attacking the YPG.
Russian-Turkish ties also hold the key to Idlib.
By early 2019 it was believed that up to two to
three million civilians lived in the last 
rebel province, swelled by fighters and their
families fleeing other fallen rebel areas.
Turkey worries many would flee over the
neighbouring border were Idlib to fall, adding
to the three to four million Syrian refugees it is
already struggling to host. It also fears that 
Jihadists from Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS),
formerly the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al
Nusra, will cross with them. Ankara adopted a
two-fold strategy to prevent this. Firstly, it
sought to unify the remaining moderate and
non-Jihadists rebels in Idlib, hoping to weaken
HTS and deter an al-Assad attack.12
Secondly, it negotiated with Russia to hold off
any al-Assad invasion. The latter worked, with
Russia agreeing to a ceasefire in September
2018. However, the former failed, with HTS
decimating moderate forces in early 2019,
leaving it as the dominant actor in Idlib. The
Russia-Turkey agreement explicitly called 
for, “radically minded groups, including 
al-Nusra,” to be withdrawn from the frontline,
so Moscow may well use the HTS advance as
an excuse to let al-Assad off the leash. Once
again, much will depend on Turkey’s ability 
to negotiate with Russia and much could 
be determined by what is agreed or not 
between the two on the east.
II.3 Israel
Israel was the least involved of Syria’s 
neighbours for most of the conflict. Its border
was closed due to the formal state of war that
still exists with Damascus, though a handful
of refugees were allowed through for medical
assistance. Israel had no love of the regime,
a long-standing enemy, but it was also 
cautious of the rebels – conscious that a new
government, possibly dominated by Islamists,
might re-open the long dormant Golan front.
As such it was relatively happy for two foes 
to waste resources fighting each other, and
for a while even welcomed Hezbollah’s 
12 Haid, Turkey’s Gradual Efforts to Professionalize Syrian Allies, 2018.
ORIENT II/201912
Christopher Phillips
involvement as it drained and distracted the
Lebanese militia too. Israel actually gained
from the early conflict when it successfully
lobbied the US to remove al-Assad’s chemical
weapons stockpile, which Damascus had 
initially built to counter Israel’s nuclear 
advantage and Israel feared might fall into the
hands of Hezbollah or Jihadists. 
However, with the war turning in al-Assad’s
favour, Israel became alarmed by how 
embedded Iran and its proxies were be-
coming in Syria. Hezbollah in particular was a
worry, having adapted to the challenges it
faced. Despite losing 1,000-2,000 fighters, it
had more than doubled its number to 20,000
since 2011.13 Likewise, its battle-hardened
soldiers gained new urban warfare ex-
perience that could be deployed against 
Israel. Iran has also used the war as cover to
boost Hezbollah’s arsenal, now up to 130,000
rockets and missiles, compared with barely
15,000 during the 2006 war.14
An Israel-Hezbollah-Iran war is far from in-
evitable however. Hezbollah still sufficiently
fears a domestic backlash to avoid un-
necessarily provoking Israel, while Israeli 
Premier Benjamin Netanyahu is instinctively
cautious and wary of the damage any new
conflict would bring. Russia’s presence in
Syria has also inserted a new mediator on
good terms with Israel, Iran and Hezbollah,
which might de-escalate any potential
clashes. Indeed, Russian pressure following
Israeli lobbying ensured that Hezbollah with-
drew from positions captured by rebels on the
Golan border in 2018. Even so, Israel has
made it policy to launch dozens of attacks on
Hezbollah and Iranian forces throughout the
war, targeting weapons convoys and 
commanders to act as a warning. New ‘rules
of the game’ are still developing in southern
Syria between the protagonists, and once
again much will depend on Russia’s ability to
mediate if any red lines are crossed. 
II.4 Saudi Arabia and Qatar
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both seen their
once considerable influence over the conflict
diminish in recent years. Each were 
enthusiastic backers of the anti-al-Assad 
opposition and sponsored various rebel 
fighting groups in the early years of the war.
They contributed to the rebels’ weakness by
backing multiple rival groups rather than a 
single entity, with Qatar especially deploying a
‘scattergun’ approach. Rivalry between these
two Gulf powers also split the opposition, with
Doha favouring the Syrian Muslim Brother-
hood (MB), like its ally Turkey, while Riyadh
has long opposed the MB and backed its 
rivals.15 Saudi Arabia ultimately ended Qatar’s
serious involvement in Syria when it wrestled
control of the SOC from Doha in 2013. 
Yet eventually Saudi influence waned too.
Some of this was beyond Saudi control: 
after Russia intervened, Riyadh came to
recognise the shifting conditions on the
ground. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was 
distracted elsewhere with the Yemen war
from 2015 and its blockade of Qatar from
2017. Increasing tension with its once-
ally Turkey, which displaced the kingdom as
the leading rebel sponsor, and alignment with 
the policies with Donald Trump also had an
effect, and Riyadh ultimately cut its support for
the armed rebels soon after Trump did.16
Since 2013, Qatar has played only a minor
role in Syria, largely echoing and supporting
Turkish policy. Saudi Arabia, however, has
changed tack. In late 2018, its close ally 
the UAE announced it was reopening its
13 Blanford, Hezbollah’s Evolution, 2017.
14 Sheikh and Williams, Hezbollah’s missiles and rockets, 2018.
15 Phillips and valbjorn, What’s in a name, 2018.
16 Lund, How Assad’s Enemies Gave Up on the Syrian Opposition, 2017.
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Damascus embassy, closed in protest along-
side other Arab embassies in 2011. Other
Saudi allies, Bahrain and Kuwait, stated they
too would soon follow. While the UAE had its
own motives, this was also a test balloon for
Saudi Arabia to reopen ties. There were even 
suggestions that Saudi Arabia may approve
al-Assad’s return to the Arab League, having
been suspended in 2011. Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE seem motivated by the hope 
that reengaging al-Assad and providing 
some reconstruction investment might lessen 
Damascus’ reliance on Riyadh’s arch-enemy,
Iran. They may also wish to outmanoeuvre
Turkey, whose support for the MB and Qatar
continues to rile. Improving its influence in
Syria at a time when Ankara is looking 
increasingly powerless beyond its border-
lands may have some advantages. However,
al-Assad is unlikely to abandon Iran and 
his regime has decades of experience in 
taking money from the Gulf without ultimately
delivering much in return.
III. Endgame?
How these shifting external and internal 
factors will interact and play out moving 
forward is difficult to forecast, but one of 
three broad scenarios seems most likely: a
negotiated compromise, al-Assad is 
victorious, or the war re-opens. 
Given the dynamics discussed above, the first
seems least likely. The drive for a negotiated
settlement has been led by al-Assad’s 
external enemies, especially Western states,
via the UN. Yet when al-Assad was at his
weakest, Russia successfully derailed these.
Now that he is in the ascendency, there is
even less incentive for him or his allies to 
engage. Moreover, external advocates are
losing enthusiasm for compromise. Saudi
Arabia is entertaining reconciliation, while
Turkey is increasingly beholden to Russia.
The US under Donald Trump seems dis-
interested and, when it withdraws troops, will
have less leverage on the ground. The 
US and EU still hope that withholding re-
construction aid and maintaining sanctions
might pressure Moscow to force al-Assad out,
but this is unrealistic. Moscow has no desire
to see al-Assad leave, nor can it remove him
without acquiescence from Iran and other 
Syrian regime insiders, who have fought an
eight-year war to keep the Syrian president in
place. Western aid is important, but not 
essential, and the Syrian regime has shown
already that it would rather live in rubble than
compromise. Moreover, recent history 
suggests it is Western states that are more
likely to eventually fold.
The most likely outcome, then, is some kind of
al-Assad victory. Even if this is packaged 
by Russia as a ‘negotiated settlement’ to 
legitimise external reengagement, it will not
likely be more than a new constitution and
sham elections that ultimately leave al-Assad
in charge. This may not be neat and it could
take years for al-Assad to regain control of all
of Syria, if he ever does. Afrin and the 
Euphrates Shield zone may become a per-
manent Turkish satellite, perhaps including
Manbij, while parts of Idlib could remain 
similarly under Turkish-protected rebel rule.
That said, Turkish Syria policy has been
highly personalised around Erdoğan and a 
future leader may opt to withdraw. In 
al-Assad-ruled Syria, meanwhile, with the
West likely to withhold at least some of the 
estimated USD 400 billion needed to rebuild
and Russia, Iran, the Gulf and possibly China
unable to fully make up the difference, the
economy may struggle. It will also be hindered
by the huge brain drain caused by the exodus
of over five million refugees. Low-level 
violence could continue, with attacks from 
former rebels, Jihadists or Kurds. Similarly, 
Israel or Turkey could launch limited raids 
that are destructive if not destabilising. 
Meanwhile al-Assad and his cronies would
likely continue the corrupt and brutal rule 
that sparked the rebellion in the first place.
Christopher Phillips
ORIENT II/201914
Such a scenario would be an al-Assad victory,
but a somewhat pyrrhic one.
The third possibility is that the war reopens.
This could come from the outside, with an 
Israeli or Turkish attack escalating into a
major conflict that Russia proves unable to
contain. Alternatively, it could come from the
inside. If Moscow cannot strike a deal, an 
al-Assad-PYD conflict could break out. The
remaining rebels and HTS in Idlib are well
armed and, if Russia and Turkey cannot find
agreement, a major battle for the province
could be long and bloody. There is also the
chance of a renewed uprising, especially if 
al-Assad makes no concessions. Former
rebels might be drawn into rebellion once
again, as could Jihadists. Alternatively, 
al-Assad loyalists could pose a potential
threat. Having sacrificed a lot to preserve the
regime, unrest could break out among those
unhappy with the slow pace of economic 
recovery or a return to pre-war corruption and
cronyism.17 There is also the possibility of
sudden shocks, such as the death of 
al-Assad, which might provoke internal blood-
letting among rival segments of the regime
over succession. Iran and Russia, for 
example, may favour different candidates.
Likewise, a change of leadership in Russia,
though probably not Iran, might prompt an 
unexpected shift in policy from al-Assad’s ally.
For the moment, war exhaustion makes this
option less likely, but it cannot be ruled out in
the medium term.
IV. Conclusion
However Syria’s future plays out, the 
country’s destiny has long been out of Syrian
hands alone. Since 2011, regional and inter-
national powers have intervened in domestic
struggles to shape the outcome of the civil
war. As the war winds down, regional powers’
once considerable influence has been 
reduced, especially that of Saudi Arabia and
Qatar. Israel and Turkey are more able to 
determine outcomes on the ground, though
limited to the south and north respectively.
The US, which perhaps could have countered
the direction of the war had it ever prioritised
al-Assad’s defeat over its many other goals,
seems increasingly disinterested and is 
lessening its leverage further by removing
troops. This leaves al-Assad’s close allies
Russia and Iran as by far the most influential
players, and of these the former dominates.
Putin has positioned himself as the key 
broker inside and outside of Syria and it
seems likely that the endgame of the Syria
war, most probably an al-Assad victory, 
will be shaped as much in Moscow as 
Damascus. That said, this war has fre-
quently shown itself to be unpredictable, and
an unexpected turn could yet reopen conflict
and present new challenges.
17 Khatib and Sinjab, Syria’s transactional state, 2018.
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